Florida Law Review
Volume 2

Issue 3

Article 9

January 1949

Eminent Domain: Just Compensation to Include Costs of Removal
Morton H. Silver

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Morton H. Silver, Eminent Domain: Just Compensation to Include Costs of Removal, 2 Fla. L. Rev. 429
(1949).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol2/iss3/9

This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Silver: Eminent Domain: Just Compensation to Include Costs of Removal
CASE COMMENTS
distinguished in that in the Miller case the wife accepted a settlement with
full knowledge of her husband's extensive property, whereas in the principal case the husband's property holdings and personal wealth greatly
15
increased after the divorce decree was granted. The Dix case, also in conflict with the principal case and most decisions under the statute, differs in
that the property settlement was not merely an agreement to pay stated
sums at certain intervals in lieu of alimony and suit money but, on the
contrary, was a property settlement between the parties for other claims.
Thus in the instant case the Court must necessarily have construed the
property settlement in lieu of alimony and within the terms of the statute,
subject to modification upon a proper showing.
The decision of the Court is in accord with the mandate of the Legislature as expressed in the statute, ". .. it shall be the duty of the judges
of the circuit courts of this state to construe liberally the provisions
hereof." 1 6
CARL. G. SVANSON

EMINENT DOMAIN: JUST COMPENSATION TO
INCLUDE COSTS OF REMOVAL
United States v. Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co.,
170 F.2d 752 (C. C. A. 1st 1948)
The United States filed condemnation proceedings, under the Second
War Powers' Act,1 for certain property occupied by Westinghouse under
a lease expiring in October, 1944. Pursuant to the Court's order, the Federal Government took and retained possession eight months beyond the
expiration of the respondent's, lease. The District Court awarded West",Dix v. Dix, 140 Fla. 91, 191 So. 205 (1939).
" F.A. STAT. 65.15 (1941).

156 STAT. 176, 177 (1942):
"The Secretary of War . . . may cause proceedings to be instituted in any
court having jurisdiction of such proceedings, to acquire by condemnation, any
real property, temporary use thereof, or other interest therein .... Upon or
after the filing of the condemnation petition, immediate possession may be
taken ...."
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inghouse the costs of removal as part of "just compensation,"

2

whereupon

the Government appealed. HELD, the damages of the lessee properly included his costs of removal. Judgment affirmed, Chief Justice Magruder
dissenting.
When property is taken by eminent domain, the owner is entitled under
3
Although the Constituthe Federal Constitution to just compensation.
tion does not define just compensation, it is held to be the market value
4
of the interest as determined by the general demand for the property at
6
the time of the taking5 and not the value to either of the parties. When
the fee simple is taken in federal condemnation proceedings, evidence of
damage to the following is rejected: good will and the expense of relocation; 7 future loss of profits, cost of moving fixtures and personal property,
8
and other consequential losses.
It is immaterial whether a leasehold interest is taken or a tenant's
9
right of occupation is destroyed; compensation must be made. When the
entire interest in a leasehold is condemned, just compensation does not
include costs of removal and relocation, since the lessee must vacate at the
end of his term in any event. 10 Compensation under these circumstances
is the value of the use and occupancy of the leasehold for the remainder

'United States v. Two Parcels of Land in Springfield, 71 F. Supp. 1001 (D. Mass.
1947).
3U. S. CONST. AMEND. V.
'Olson v. United States, 292 U. S. 246 (1934); City of New York v. Sage, 239
U. S. 57 (1915) ; see United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U. S. 372, 377 (1946).
'Seaboard A. L. Ry. v. United States, 261 U. S. 299 (1923); see Danforth v.
United States, 308 U. S. 271, 283 (1939) ; United States v. Klamath and Moadoc
Tribes, 304 U. S. 119, 123 (1938).
'Olson v. United States, 292 U. S. 246 (1934); United States v. Chandler-Dunbar
Water Power Co., 229 U. S. 53 (1913) ; see United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327
U. S. 372, 377 (1946).
'United States ex rel. TVA v. Powelson, 319 U. S. 266 (1943) ; Mitchell v. United
States, 267 U. S. 341 (1925); Joslin Mfg. Co. v. Providence, 262 U. S. 668 (1923)
see United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U. S. 372, 377 (1946).
8
Mullen Benevolent Corp. v. United States, 290 U. S. 89 (1933); Bothwell v.
United States, 254 U. S. 231 (1920) ; see United States v. General Motors Corp., 323
U. S. 373, 379 (1945); ORGL, VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DomArN 220-252.
gUnited States v. Welch, 217 U. S. 333 (1910) ; United States v. 53% Acres of
Land in Brooklyn, 139 F.2d 244 (C. C. A. 2nd 1943), cert. denied, 322 U. S. 730
(1944); Uhiited States v. Brewster Aeronautical Corp., 60 F. Supp. 314 (D. N. J.
1945) ; see Mullen Benevolent Corp. v. United States, 290 U. S. 89 (1933).
IoUnited States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U. S. 372 (1946).
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of his term, minus the amount due the lessor."3 Consideration, however,
is given to the fact that he may have an option to renew his lease.' 2 When
only a part of the leasehold rental period is condemned, the courts have
allowed the lessee the reasonable costs of preparation of the space for
occupancy by the Government, removal of his property and its subsequent
return to the premises.23 Permitting the latter award is an exception to
the general rule, since the remaining interest is of little value to the lessee,
who is still obligated under the original lease.' 4
The principal case, in holding that only part of the interest had been
taken, based its decision upon the conclusion expressed in United States v.
General Motors Corp.,' 5 in which a similar factual situation was involved.
In that case the Government condemned one year out of an unexpired term
of six years and obtained the power of indefinite extension. Costs of removal were allowed. The principal case differs, however, in that, between
the commencement of the proceedings and the date of judgment, the Government had taken the entire interest of the condemnee by exercising the
options sought in the proceedings. Hence, all damages due the condemnee
were ascertainable at the time of judgment; whereas in the GeneralMotors
case judgment had been rendered before the expiration of his lease. In the
principal case it would seem that the Court of Appeals should not have
awarded costs of removal, since the Government had chosen to take the
remainder of the condemnee's interest before judgment.' 6
The difficulty in cases of this sort is the ascertainment of the condemnee's damages when the Government has taken a portion of the leasehold period, with the power to take the rest at its option. Neither the
amount nor its payments need be settled before the Government takes possession of property by eminent domain, since just compensation is insured
by a pledge of the public faith and credit.' 7 Therefore, such controversies
"'Id.at 381; John Hancock Ins. Co. v. United States, 155 F.2d 977 (C. C. A. 1st
1946), cert. denied, 329 U. S. 774 (1946).
"United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U. S. 372 (1946).
2-'United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U. S. 373 (1944); see United States
v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U. S. 372, 379 (1945).
"'Ibid.
1323 U. S. 373 (1944).
"United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U. S. 372 (1946); see United States v.
Westinghouse, 170 F.2d 752, (C. C. A. 1st 1948) (dissenting opinion).
27yearsley v. Ross Constr'n Co., 309 U. S. 18 (1940); Hurley v. Kincaid 285 U. S.
95 (1932) ; United States v. McIntosh, 3 F. Supp. 715 (E. D. Va. 1933) ; see Seaboard
A. L. Ry., 261 U. S. 299, 306 (1923).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1949

3

